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Democratic Solidarity: Why Do Democracies 
Owe Support to Democracy Movements?*
ABSTRACT
This article starts by pointing out the internal tensions in the idea of a human right to democracy, which makes it difficult to use 
such a right as a normative reference for decisions on interfering in domestic conflicts in other states. Despite this, the second 
part of this article shows that it is still admissible for outsiders to interfere in domestic affairs when democracy is seriously 
curtailed or democratic revolutions are occurring. The article ends by showing why democracies owe support to democracy 
movements abroad. Democracies should show solidarity with these movements in the pursuit of their aim to democratize the 
political order of the state in question — a support that is not unconditional, but tied to a specific cause.
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Solidaridad democrática. ¿Por qué deben las democracias apoyar movimientos 
democráticos?
RESUMEN
Este artículo comienza señalando las tensiones internas que existen en el concepto de un derecho humano a la democracia, 
lo que hace difícil usar tal derecho como referencia normativa para tomar decisiones respecto a si interferir o no en conflictos 
domésticos de otros estados. A pesar de esto, la segunda parte de este artículo muestra que todavía es permisible que agentes 
extranjeros interfieran con asuntos domésticos cuando la democracia es seriamente coartada o cuando están ocurriendo 
revoluciones democráticas. El artículo concluye mostrando por qué las democracias deben apoyar movimientos democráticos 
en el exterior. Las democracias deben solidarizarse con estos movimientos que buscan democratizar el orden político del 
estado en cuestión. Este apoyo no es incondicional, sino que está atado a una causa específica.
PALABRAS CLAVE
Derechos humanos, democracia, cambio de régimen, filosofía de los asuntos internacionales.
Solidariedade democrática, por que as democracias devem apoiar movimentos 
democráticos?
RESUMO
Este artigo começa apontando as tensões internas que existem no conceito de um direito humano à democracia, o que torna 
difícil usar tal direito como referência normativa para tomar decisões sobre se deve ou não interferir em conflitos domésticos 
de outros estados. Apesar disto, a segunda parte deste artigo mostra que ainda é permissível que agentes estrangeiros 
interfiram com assuntos domésticos quando a democracia é seriamente limitada ou quando está acontecendo revoluções 
democráticas. O artigo conclui mostrando por que as democracias devem apoiar movimentos democráticos no exterior. As 
democracias devem solidarizar-se com estes movimentos que procuram democratizar a ordem política do estado em questão. 
Este apoio não é incondicional, mas, sim, está atado a uma causa específica.
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A
fter September 11, 2001 it seemed that the 
brief phase during which the world was 
moving toward ever more democracy and 
common human rights protection was 
over. Many saw international terrorism as 
the new major threat — and as a consequence human 
rights were curtailed in order to not stand in the way 
of the war on terror (Blum and Heyman 2010; Heyman 
2001-2002; Holmes 2007; Margulies 2006). Regime chan-
ge (often labeled as democratization) appeared to be a 
viable way of punishing states for harboring or suppor-
ting terrorists. For others, this gave the impression that 
both human rights and especially the project to demo-
cratize states were nothing but attempts to cover Wes-
tern hegemonic projects or its ruthless pursuit of its own 
interests (Bellamy 2004; Williams and Bellamy 2005). 
The defense of the right to non-interference, the main-
tenance of domestic basic rights within Western states 
and generally the critique of war as a means of politics 
became key issues for these critical positions.
However, several “democratic” revolutions have occurred 
since September 11, 2001 in which protesters, activists 
and regular citizens fought for more democratic, rights-
abiding and accountable forms of government, open and 
free elections and general access to social, cultural and 
economic goods. These protesters often asked for inter-
national support and their protests were partly success-
ful because of international reactions and aid. During 
both the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 
Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, NGOs, Western State 
Departments and international human rights activists 
played important roles by financing activist groups, ren-
dering the developments globally public and exercising 
pressure on Western and local governments and the EU. 
During the 2009 Green Revolution in Iran and the 2011 
Arab Spring, the direct involvement was less obvious 
(with the exception of Libya, where the focus on democ-
racy was not as strong as it was in Algeria or Egypt), but 
it was certainly requested from many protesters (Inbar 
2013). The same is true for the ongoing and continuously 
growing civil war in Syria.
The support the protesters requested was not just asked 
as a favor. The protesters appealed to the common glob-
al aim of creating conditions in which everybody can 
control and participate in the exercise of government. 
They tried (and in the case of Syria, at least some, still 
try) to convey the idea that they were (or are) fighting 
for their human right to democracy — and since this is 
a human right, the rest of the world, and especially the 
rest of the democratic world, could not just stand by. 
Instead, it is obliged to intervene or at least openly sup-
port the protests against autocrats, dictators and more 
generally oppressive regimes.
During the Iran protests, the Arab Spring and especially 
in Syria many Western states reacted with reservations 
(Huber 2012): They expressed some support for the gen-
eral aims of the protests, but they were reluctant to get 
involved more actively (with the notable exception of 
Libya). Some human rights activists in Western societ-
ies even pointed out that there was no human right to 
democracy and that support for parties in domestic polit-
ical conflicts could further weaken the already weak in-
ternational human rights regime by creating an obvious 
link between human rights and a specific, democratic 
form of government (Merkel 2011). Such a link, these 
activists feared, would significantly reduce the willing-
ness of more autocratic governments to cooperate with 
human rights organizations, which would ultimately 
have negative consequences for those subject to “real” 
human rights violations (this means most of all ethnic 
cleansing, religious persecution or starvation).
There were many good and politically realistic reasons for 
these reservations. Nevertheless, they also had the effect 
of reinforcing the disappointment with (Western) democ-
racies and their presumably primarily economic or hege-
monic interests in other regions of the world. Democracies 
seemed to care more for stability or even economic pros-
perity than for political and individual freedom. In light 
of these disappointments, this article will look more care-
fully at the claim to international support for democracy 
movements.1 It will start by briefly analyzing a possible 
human right to democracy and point out an internal ten-
sion in such a right, which makes it a rather problematic 
point of reference. Given this, the article will continue 
by asking if it is admissible at all for states and interna-
tional actors to promote democracy and to interfere with 
domestic conflicts about the nature of government. After 
arguing that this is admissible, the article will conclude 
by showing why democracies owe support to democracy 
movements abroad. Democracies should show solidarity 
with these movements, which means that they owe them 
support in the pursuit of their aim to democratize the po-
litical order of the state in question — a support that is not 
unconditional, but tied to a specific cause.
1 The present article will not look into general duties to support or 
not to harm other democracies — and it will also not say anything 
on the possible obligation to provide members of failed states with 
capabilities of building and operating state institutions. Concerning 
these subjects see Niederberger (2009a).




A Human Right to Democracy?
One of the hotly contested issues in the philosophical de-
bate on human rights is the question of whether there 
is something like a human right to democracy. Such a 
human right to democracy is defended by theories that as-
sume that private autonomy ultimately depends on public 
autonomy or that the two are at least co-original.2 Accord-
ing to these views, rights require a public political and 
legal order and such an order can only be legitimate and 
non-dominating if it is a democratic order.3 Thus, democ-
racy is prior to or necessary for the guarantee of any other 
(human) right. Therefore, if there are any human rights 
at all, a human right to democracy must be established 
first or in conjunction with any other right.
Many see flaws in this argumentation. One group of critics 
rejects the idea that democracy is more or equally funda-
mental than peace or justice. For these critics, democracy 
might be basic in some sense, but it either relies on peace-
ful living conditions or its importance depends on its in-
strumental necessity for the requirements of justice. In 
light of these criticisms, a human right to democracy is 
not an unconditional right. It can at most be derived from 
other basic claims or rights, but it is not an original human 
right that would entitle one to act against peace or just 
conditions (Geis, Brock and Müller 2006; Maus 1998, 1999). 
A second group of critics (to which, for instance, John 
Rawls belongs) thinks that democracy is only one ideal of 
government, namely an ideal based on equality, and that 
there could be other types of decent — and this means less 
egalitarian, but still human rights protecting — forms of 
government that one would have to accept as expressions 
of other preferences for political (self-)organization (Ber-
nstein 2006; Cohen 2010; Rawls 1999, 59-70; Reidy 2006). 
According to this perspective, there are different cultural 
and religious understandings of the scope and role of pub-
lic order and on the grounds of these understandings, 
different peoples might end up choosing types of less egali-
tarian and liberal forms of government.
In my view, these criticisms are not convincing (or at least 
not fully convincing). The first criticism that democracy 
is not desirable per se does not sufficiently capture the 
2 Jürgen Habermas (1996, 84-104) first developed the argument 
for the co-originality of private and public autonomy. Different 
argumentations for a human right to democracy can be found, 
among others, in Bohman (2007, 101-134), Christiano (2011), Gould 
(2004) and, most recently, Peter (2013).
3 On this argument that a democratic order is necessary for the 
legitimate guarantee of rights, see also Benhabib (2009).
character of human rights as rights and their dependence 
on a public order in which persons do not have to rely on 
the moral motivations of other private or public actors.4 
The second criticism that democracy is only one ideal of 
government is correct in some sense. It rightly points to 
the non-universality of specific democratic institutions or 
procedures and also to the non-universality of interpreta-
tions of the content and scope of basic rights and rights to 
participation. A human right to democracy could, thus, 
not be a right to a public order with a specific ordering of 
powers, a specific election mode and specific basic rights 
expressing a specific idea of equality. However, what the 
criticism misses is that another type of government — 
which means a government without these features of typ-
ical liberal democracies — can only claim legitimacy (or at 
least international legitimacy) if it can show that it can be 
traced back to the will of the people living under it. In this 
sense, the second criticism of a human right to democracy 
presupposes a more fundamental right to self-determina-
tion, which will only create obligations (of respect or non-
interference, for instance) in others if this right is not only 
exercised by some members of a political unit in order to 
dominate other members of the same unit. Thus, there 
must be at least some equality present in the presumable 
collective will formation.
The second criticism is mistaken if it generally argues 
against a human right to democracy. However, it high-
lights important difficulties and maybe even tensions in 
such a human right: Democracy means that all those liv-
ing in a certain political and social order are ultimately 
those controlling and deciding on the form of co-existence 
and its regulation.5 Given this, such a right can never be 
simply implemented by a third party, since it always al-
ready requires the inclusion and participation of those who 
will be affected by a given order. Imposing the right to self-
determination is contradictory if the imposition is not at 
the same time its revocation and putting it at the disposal 
of those who can and will determine themselves.6
Nevertheless, this conceptual tension between rights 
and their structural withdrawal of certain political and 
legal options, on the one hand, and the exercise of self-
4 Concerning the necessary link between rights and public order see 
Kant (1996, 84-86) (Doctrine of Right, §§ 41-42). For a more extended 
discussion of this link, see Maus (1992). Joel Feinberg (1970) provides 
a different kind of argument for the dependency of rights on a public 
(and not only moral) order.
5 On the connections among democracy, law and control, see 
Niederberger (2011a).
6 For a more detailed version of this argument see Beetham (2009) and 
Niederberger (2009b).
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determination, in which nothing but the political col-
lective can authorize any regulation and withdrawal, on 
the other hand, is not the only and maybe not even the 
major problem for a human right to democracy.7 This 
tension becomes much less problematic if one considers 
the dynamic and reflexive aspects of many modern insti-
tutional and legal structures and the general perspective 
of a reflexive or deliberative democratic order (cf., among 
others, Bohman and Rehg 1997; Parkinson and Mans-
bridge 2012; Schmalz-Bruns 1995). The bigger problem 
is that a human right to democracy is too underdeter-
mined to serve as a normative or even legal-political ori-
entation. A human right to democracy would mean that 
persons have the right not to be subject to dominating 
institutions and structures. However, even in a negative 
perspective, it is not fully clear if and when institutions 
and structures are dominating — such that even the ob-
ligation to help persons against dominating institutions 
needs further clarification. Moreover, clarification is 
all the more necessary with regard to “positive” obliga-
tions, which means with regard to obligations concern-
ing the institutions and structures that must be put into 
place for an order to realize the right in its positive and 
enabling dimensions. Democracy does not just consist 
of the absence of dominating institutions; rather, it pri-
marily consists of institutions and procedures that en-
able self-legislation and self-government.
Given all this, the talk of a “human right to democracy” 
indicates a very general and right normative claim.8 
Nonetheless, it is hard to see how this talk could be 
transformed into the specific obligations, structures and 
procedures that are required.9 Any such transformation 
7 On the general difficulties this tension poses, see Holmes (1988).
8 The following argumentation is, thus, not rejecting the normative 
idea behind a human right to democracy; rather, it criticizes the 
proposal to think of the normative claims inherent in this idea in 
terms of a right or more particularly a human right. This criticism, 
in turn, is based on an understanding of rights, according to 
which rights are not just prima facie goods or entitlements that 
must be balanced or distributed with regard to certain criteria. 
Rights themselves distribute duties and options and as one of their 
major features they give the rights holder the privilege to decide 
on their actualization (and not the duty holder). Concerning this 
understanding of rights and human rights, see Niederberger (2013).
9 One of the important strands of contemporary human rights theory 
conceives of human rights in a “practical” (Beitz, 2009) or “politi-
cal” (Raz, 2010) theory. The idea of these theories, which often refer 
to the understanding of human rights in Rawls’ The Law of Peoples, 
is to reconstruct human rights as an essential component of the 
(at least partially) institutionalized international (legal) order. Ac-
cording to these theories, violations of human rights are the only 
admissible reasons for interventions into other states, while it is 
acknowledged that states are almost always required for the secur-
ing of human rights. The international order or intervening states 
is subject to criticism in light of the right itself. This is 
because some people who are subject to the duties and/
or institutions might not agree that their particular 
shape expresses their understanding of their purposes, 
which would already require a democratic procedure to 
take a legitimate decision.10
One good example of these difficulties is the controversy 
about the right to free speech and its role in democracy. 
While some, most importantly the US Supreme Court 
(for instance in its 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission decision), think that free speech is only guaran-
teed if there is no public regulation, others, for instance 
the German Constitutional Court (in its several decisions 
on the public broadcasting system in Germany) argue 
that free speech is only guaranteed if the public realm is 
politically and legally organized such that all have (equal) 
access to public deliberations.11 This controversy con-
fronts two possible interpretations of a human right to 
democracy or its implications and it cannot be decided by 
reference to such a human right alone.
Can the promotion of democracy  
in other states ever be admissible?
Claiming a human right to democracy can have a lot of rhe-
torical and motivational force. However, such a right is 
not suitable for institutional and legal implementation 
and not even for clear moral or political obligations. In 
extreme cases of totalitarian political systems (presum-
ably mostly negative) obligations might be evident, but 
in most situations attempts to realize a human right to 
democracy are easily themselves violations of it. This 
raises the question of whether it can ever be admissible 
to promote democracy somewhere else — or would one 
have to say that ultimately accepting the base-line (this 
can, thus, usually not supplement the state. See among others 
Beitz (2009, 102-106); Cohen (2008); Nickel (2007, 9-21); Raz (2010). 
Some of these approaches present theories of human rights with 
an intimate link between human rights, their institutionalization 
and democracy, such that human rights (ultimately) depend on de-
mocracy and vice versa. These thoughts are related to the argument 
in this section, but it is important to note that in these theories and 
in the present article democracy and human rights relate to each 
other, but are not identical. In this sense, a “human right to de-
mocracy” is a misleading attempt to cover the necessary difference 
between the two — without such a difference human rights could 
not presuppose democracy or vice versa.
10 On this question see Seyla Benhabib’s argument that democracy 
essentially consists of iterating laws and decisions (Benhabib 
2004, 171-172).
11 Concerning this controversy, see also Sunstein (2000).




means the general normative idea behind it) of a human 
right to democracy implies respecting the necessity that 
different contexts achieve their own democracies or 
forms of self-determination?
Such a conclusion would be much too easy: We live in a 
world in which people, societies and states are intercon-
nected in many different ways and where there are no 
simply distinct political contexts. Does it sufficiently re-
spect the right of others to their own democracy or self-
determination if one exports weapons or luxury goods 
to the other contexts or if one invests in or divests from 
another state? Why should the desire of some to (be able 
to) import certain goods be compatible with the claim 
to self-determination, while the desire of others to (be 
able to) receive political aid be incompatible with such 
a claim? Economic, social, cultural and scientific coop-
eration clearly influences the stability of political orders 
in many ways. Therefore, aspects and institutions of 
another state that are important for its maintenance or 
flourishing might depend on this cooperation and not, 
or at least not directly, on the proper choices of (all) the 
people living in this state. It would be strange if all these 
economic or technological kinds of cooperation with 
their potential political implications were allowed, but 
the promotion of democracy — for instance with publi-
cations or even the support of certain political groups — 
was not. In a globalized, interdependent world, mutual 
interference with possible consequences for the main-
tenance or change of political orders takes place all the 
time and if we do not want to significantly reduce this 
interdependence, the promotion of democracy in other 
places must be admissible in some sense.
Given the argumentation in the preceding section of 
this article, it is clearly inadmissible to simply impose 
one more or less comprehensive democratic system on 
another context.12 Such an inadmissible imposition 
includes the creation of robust institutions and proce-
dures, which later on have their own perseverance and 
raise costs, if people want to change them.13 Support for 
democracy movements can only take on forms whereby 
12 The following arguments are part of non-ideal theory; this means 
that I do not assume that we can start with the more or less direct 
construction of a global multilevel transnational democracy. If we 
started with such an ideal global order, the protection and promotion 
of democracy on the different levels could take on forms other than 
the ones discussed in what follows.
13 Against the argument in the text, one could also say that such 
perseverance and costs are necessary to secure the future of 
democracy in a given context — but I will not consider this 
possibility here.
people living in the coming democracy will be able to 
eventually revise it. Moreover, if there is no indication 
of any democracy movement, it would also not be very 
plausible to interfere with an existing society — at least 
if we cannot attribute this absence to notable severe and 
systematic violations of basic rights and/or other mech-
anisms of silencing possible democracy or participatory 
movements. Before any promotion of democracy occurs, 
addressees or receivers of this promotion should be rath-
er obvious — and this means obvious in a way that is not 
related to possible funds for a democracy movement or 
even directly the result of external interference or cre-
ation (which is, for instance, one of the major difficul-
ties of support for opposition groups in exile).14
Any support for democracy movements runs the risk of 
being parochial. This risk can only be countered if those 
promoting democracy (this means the supporters, not 
those within the democracy movement who are sup-
ported — even though it might also apply to them) un-
derline the basic openness of any democratic society for 
learning. This implies, first of all, that those promoting 
democracy should themselves be open to learn from the 
contexts in which they are promoting democracy. Some 
authors have rightly pointed out that the best argument 
for election monitors is to accept election monitors one-
self — thereby showing that democratic procedures can 
fail everywhere and that everybody must have an inter-
est in others observing the correctness of procedures, 
institutions and access to them (Lister 2012, 275).15 De-
mocracies are (or should be) structurally suspicious of 
(always possible) abuses of powers and institutions and 
not be too self-confident about their democratic nature.
Nevertheless, the admissibility of democracy promo-
tion does not only depend on general rules or princi-
ples. There are different and differently intrusive forms 
of support for democracy and democracy movements 
abroad. The strongest forms are direct, possibly even 
coercive interventions with the aim to secure elections, 
the formation of parties, the building of institutions or 
the rule of law. As mentioned previously, such direct 
interventions are dangerous because by their very mode 
of operation they threaten democracy and the non-
coercive character of democratic procedures, majority 
14 In this respect, see the extensive research literature on the successes 
and failures of democracy promotion and political conditionality in 
the external relations of the EU.
15 See also the reports on official threats against election monitors of 
the US presidential election in 2012 in different media, for example 
McGreal (2012).
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and will formation. For instance, some people argue 
that the more or less direct Western support of certain 
groups and persons in many of the post-USSR states, 
which often turned out to be corrupt, created cynical 
and skeptical attitudes toward democracy in Russia. In 
this sense, one could say that direct interventions are 
only admissible if their costs for the future of democra-
cy in a given political system are lower than their gains 
— which are obviously both often difficult to assess, 
but an assessment needs to be made.
The weakest form of democracy promotion is rhetorical 
pressure by publicly exposing and denouncing certain 
practices and developments or by calling for an election 
and other boycotts. This form is weak because it is not 
sure that this pressure will affect the situation at all — 
especially if a government controls the public sphere and 
can thereby block the potential reception and impact of 
this exposure. Such a form of democracy promotion is 
almost always admissible. However, one might ques-
tion the general and possibly changing role of the media 
in political communities; this means the fact that the 
media themselves are important political powers and 
that access to them and to public deliberation is dis-
tributed very differently. Moreover, the media can also 
contribute to the fragmentation of public discourse with 
the effect of major difficulties for procedures of common 
will formation (Sunstein 2007).
Often a middle form of democracy promotion is prac-
ticed by international and regional organizations, like 
the EU, but also by single states in the negotiation of 
trade agreements, etc. Here, the prospect of member-
ship and the accompanying advantages or economic 
support is tied to the development and maintenance of 
democratic institutions and procedures. These forms 
of democracy promotion by political conditionality 
were often quite successful because they are not open-
ly intrusive, but appeal to the egoistic interests of the 
states, rulers and societies in question.16 Nevertheless, 
they cannot exclude that democratization is perceived 
to be imposed or that states take a strategic stance to-
ward the requirements.
One can conclude generally that most forms of democ-
racy promotion, even intrusive forms, can be admissible. 
Given the interconnectedness of the world, states inter-
act all the time — and they interact in ways that have 
16 See, for instance, the role the so-called Copenhagen criteria played in 
the democratization in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.
consequences for their political orders. If forms of de-
mocracy promotion are inadmissible, this depends on 
further aspects and considerations that are not necessar-
ily tied to this promotion.
Can the promotion of democracy  
in other states ever be desirable  
or even required?
So far I have argued that it is difficult to conceive of a 
meaningful human right to democracy, but that duties 
to respect the forms of government and political order in 
other societies or states depend on their ability to dem-
onstrate that they are not dominating and express the 
will of those living in them. There is no general duty to 
refrain from promoting democracy (where democracy is 
not a specific political order, but the existence of a non-
dominating system expressing the will of those living 
in it), even though its admissibility depends on further 
considerations of specific cases — particularly consid-
erations of the future of a sustainable democratic order 
in the given case.17 However, if there is no human right 
to democracy (this means no strict duty to realize such 
an entitlement or claim), why should persons, states or 
more particularly democracies care about the promotion 
of democracy abroad? Even if it might be admissible to 
promote democracy, this could still mean that one should 
or need not do so — especially if there are good reasons 
why the (democratic) success of such interferences into 
other political systems will always depend on factors 
beyond the reach of those interfering and which might 
sometimes be very difficult to understand, recognize or 
predict. It will often be hard to answer the question of 
whether some group is really fighting for democracy and 
not rather for some particular political or religious proj-
ect or just to gain power — and many experiences with 
democratic revolutions (for instance the recent develop-
ments in Egypt or Tunisia) show that groups might ulti-
mately be more likely to fight for their own power than 
for the democratization of the state or society.
The preceding argumentation problematized the idea of 
a human right to democracy not in order to question the 
validity and obligatory character of its normative core, 
17 It is important to note that already at this point the conditions for 
the admissibility of democracy promotion abroad that I refer to 
here are structural and institutional considerations with regard to 
a future democratic order. Later in this article, I will discuss the 
question of whether considerations of the “democratic” cast of mind 
of movements in democratic revolutions should count — and I will 
argue that these considerations should not count.




but rather because of the tension between the right-char-
acter of this right and democracy as a mode of self-gov-
ernment. To problematize the idea of a human right to 
democracy in this way18 underlines the core of the claim 
not to be dominated by institutions and powerful actors 
and to only live under conditions that are the expression 
of one’s own will. This claim depends on the existence 
of an international structure that guarantees that other 
states and political actors cannot arbitrarily deprive 
a first state or society of the possibility to develop and 
achieve its own will. Ultimately, the claim can only be 
fully realized by oneself, which means that third parties 
might contribute to liberating the first state or society 
from dominating institutions and structures, but they 
cannot ensure that the first (will) live under conditions 
that express their own will. Such a will must be a col-
lective will, which entails many complicated issues, like 
the social, cultural, legal, procedural and institutional 
conditions for a common and inclusive will formation. 
Furthermore, many of these conditions can only be 
achieved over time and also depend on other economic, 
cultural and social factors and resources rather than just 
the desire to create a democracy.
The claim not to be dominated and to live under con-
ditions that express one’s own will cannot be simply 
translated into rights and obligations — especially not 
into rights and obligations between members of a state 
and other states or members of other states. Nonethe-
less, this difficulty of translating it into rights and ob-
ligations does not imply that we can have a normatively neutral 
attitude toward the realization or non-realization of this claim. As 
(one of) the most fundamental claim(s), we all have (or 
should have) an interest in its realization, even though 
there is no clear obligation and accompanying entitle-
ment to realize the claim ourselves, which means to 
enforce a specific democratic institutional structure and 
corresponding elections and/or deliberation and deci-
sion procedures on a given territory (Niederberger 2011b). 
Persons fighting for a more democratic order (again in the broad sense, 
not only those fighting for a liberal democracy) deserve the support of 
18 To state it once more, the important point of my argumentation is to 
understand the kind of obligation that democratic states and/or citizens 
of democracies have with regard to democracy movements or states 
in transition to a democratic order. Ultimately, it is not essential if 
we call the corresponding benefit or interest of such an obligation 
a “human right to democracy” or not. As previously mentioned, 
I suggest that we should not call such mere benefits or interests, 
which do not entail clear remedies and the necessary legal and 
political institutions to trigger beneficial actions, “human rights”. 
However, there are obviously many “interest” theories of human 
rights that would also call these interests or benefits corresponding 
with the obligations developed in the text “human rights”.
other (democratic) states (or members of these states) because they 
are trying to realize their basic claim, which all human beings as-
sumedly strive for. Freedom can only be achieved in common 
structures with others; therefore, we are all bound to es-
tablish democracy wherever it can be established.
Thus, democratic movements are entitled to solidarity. They 
should be supported in their fight for democratic institu-
tions and structures — and “supported” means that the 
democratic movements and their members should be 
the ones creating and establishing the institutions and 
structures and not those supporting them. Solidarity is 
the correct term for this kind of support because it un-
derlines that members of the first state/society are the 
actors and the support expresses the acknowledgment 
of the normative desirability of their movement without 
making it a common cause in the strict sense. Thus, soli-
darity means symbolic, ideal or material support and aid 
of another in her situation, projects and aims without 
necessarily presupposing that the situation, projects or 
aims are also beneficial or of interest for the supporting 
party. Only such a solidaristic relationship will exclude 
parochialism, while still being an obligation on the side 
of those being solidaristic.
On the other hand, such a relationship of solidarity is 
not unconditional and it is not support for the persons 
or groups as such. In the case of democratic movements, 
solidarity is required by the normative value of the aim 
a given movement pursues and it is directed at this aim. 
It does not entail support for specific political positions 
and actors. Therefore, solidarity can be critical of aspects 
of political or democratic movements that (seem to) run 
counter to the aim of democratizing a political and social 
order. This is a major difference to other obligations aris-
ing from human rights or duties of justice (if there are 
any). In the case of a duty of solidarity with a democracy 
movement, the obligation is not an obligation to the 
specific persons, but one related to the (possible) contri-
bution of given democracy movements or other actors to 
the transformation of the political system in question. 
Individual persons will, thus, only benefit in a mediated 
way from these obligations, namely that they might end 
up living in a democracy.
Democracy implies liberating the potentials of critique 
— and these potentials also relate to given democracy 
movements and their support from more or less estab-
lished democratic states and societies. This critical rela-
tionship will also alleviate the question of how to decide 
if a movement or group really pursues democracy or in-
creased democracy as its aim. The openness and maybe 
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even responsiveness to criticism, which is the ability 
and willingness of groups to justify their protests and 
perspectives by giving reasons for them, are certainly 
good criteria for possible candidates of support.19
It is very important that democratic solidarity is not tied 
to specific political positions or projects because only if 
it is solidarity with the aim of creating (more) democrat-
ic institutions and structures can it convey its basis in 
a universal moral obligation. Given this, I would argue 
that despite presumable political wisdom, democratic 
solidarity cannot depend on specific actors and their 
circumstances in different contexts. One could always 
interpret such a reference to specific actors as being con-
tent-bound, which means reacting to specific positions 
that parties take or interests that might be affected. 
Democratic solidarity should be as rule-bound (and not 
content-bound) as possible in order to prevent any im-
pression of partiality accompanying it.
This article argues in favor of democratic solidarity from 
a cosmopolitan perspective. It assumes that, norma-
tively seen, the realization of freedom cannot depend on 
contingent decisions and mere historical chance. People 
everywhere have the same claim to participate in the 
decisions about the rules, institutions and persons who 
shape their social actions. Democratic (or republican) 
conditions are ultimately necessary everywhere to real-
ize freedom. Under non-ideal conditions, this means 
that democratic states and citizens of democratic states 
owe democracy movements solidarity in their fight for a 
more democratic future. 
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